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Manipulative Behavior in Auction IPOs
Mira Ganor*
I. INTRODUCTION
Becoming a publicly traded company entails numerous benefits for
a company, ranging from the actual receipt of capital to increased
prestige.1 In general, initial public offerings ("IPOs") play a major
role in corporate finance and enable economic growth. 2 Book-build-
ing is the dominant method by which a company becomes public in
the United States.3 This method is administered by underwriters who
have the discretion to choose the share price and allocate the offered
shares. 4
Underwriters have been severely criticized for abusing the book-
building method to extract benefits indirectly for themselves.5 By un-
derpricing the share price in the public offering, an especially common
custom during the hot technology bubble, underwriters are able to use
their power to choose who can purchase the underpriced shares and,
thus, allegedly are able to further their own benefits.6 However, un-
derpricing the shares reduces the proceeds the issuer receives from
the public offering. 7
The Dutch auction is an alternative method for a company to be-
come public. Using this method, the company conducts an auction for
its shares and the price is set at the lowest successful bid. According to
conventional wisdom, a public offering conducted in the form of a
nondiscriminatory Dutch auction, rather than the book-building
* J.S.D. Candidate, U.C. Berkeley. Comments are welcome and can be sent to me at mganor
@boalthall.berkeley.edu. I am indebted to Jesse Fried for invaluable discussions and comments.
1. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6 (3d ed. 1996).
2. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A
COMM. CONVENED BY THE N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC. & NASD AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N 1 (2003), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/rules-
regs/p010373.pdf [hereinafter IPO REPORT].
3. See Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation, 56 J. OF
FIN. 2337, 2337 (2001).
4. Id.
5. IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Should Issuers be on the Hook for Laddering?
An Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulation Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 186
(2004).
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method, maximizes the proceeds the issuer receives from the offer-
ing.8 This is based on the common belief that the price reached in the
auction reflects the market price for the share.9 However, for some of
the companies that used the Dutch auction method for their public
offerings in the United States, shares were significantly underpriced. 10
These companies experienced share price increases of more than one
hundred percent in the market during the first days immediately fol-
lowing the offering."
This Article explores the ability of investors to influence the auction
IPO price by strategically manipulating their bid. The Article provides
a model that shows how some investors, by lowering the number of
shares they ask to purchase in the auction, can maximize their profits
from the bid and, contrary to conventional wisdom, cause underpric-
ing. Unlike the book-building method, the price increase of the shares
in the market following an auction IPO, which is triggered by inves-
tors increasing their holdings, may take longer than a couple of days
because of the investors' efforts to avoid excessive price pressure. 12
Even if a public auction is conducted in the form of a nondiscrimi-
natory Dutch auction, underpricing may occur under certain scenarios
as detailed in the models provided in this Article. 13 Thus, forcing the
market to abandon the book-building method completely and leaving
the issuers with only the auction method, as has been suggested, 14 is
likely to be inefficient.
Furthermore, an investor who lowers the number she offers to
purchase in her bid does not only gain from the resulting lowered auc-
tion price, but also has nothing to lose from her actions, as long as she
is able to purchase the additional shares in the aftermarket for no
more than the market price. Thus, this Article proposes to restrict in-
vestors who participate in the auction IPO from purchasing more
shares in the market in the period immediately following the auction.
This restriction will help deter some investors from using this strategy
to lower the auction IPO price.
However, the model shows that even if the investors are unable to
purchase shares in the aftermarket, the strategy is still profitable for
8. Laura S. Unger, Raising Capital on the Internet, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2001).
9. Id.
10. See Unger, supra note 8, at 1207-08.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
711, 788-89 (2005).
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some investors under certain conditions as analyzed in the model. 15
The behavior of lowering the amount of the bid without purchasing
additional shares in the aftermarket is almost impossible to detect.
Hence, regulatory measures cannot effectively eliminate this strategic,
manipulative behavior and the resulting underpricing, but can only re-
duce them.16
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a
brief description of the importance of the IPO mechanism and de-
scribes the two IPO methods-first, the book-building method and,
second, the auction IPO method. Part III discusses underpricing in
IPOs. It begins by reviewing the practice of setting the low price in
book-building IPOs. It then describes conventional wisdom regarding
the ability of the auction IPO to eliminate underpricing and ends by
presenting evidence to the contrary. Part IV develops the model for
strategic, manipulative bidding and shows how this type of bidding
may cause underpricing in a Dutch auction IPO. Part V discusses pos-
sible regulatory measures to avoid underpricing in auction IPO and
reaches the conclusion that such measures are required, but cannot
suffice due to the undetectable nature of the strategic bidding. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE IPO MECHANISM
The IPO is the process in which a company first offers its shares to
the public and becomes a publicly traded company. 17 Raising capital
through IPOs plays an important role in corporate finance and en-
ables economic growth.1 8 In the past decade, over five hundred billion
dollars were raised through IPOs in U.S. markets.1 9
Among the major advantages of creating a public market for a com-
pany's securities is it provides the company with access to substantial
amounts of capital. 20 The company may not be able to raise a suffi-
cient amount of funds through other forms of financing, such as debt
or private equity. The IPO not only helps the operation of the com-
pany by supplying funds, but it also increases the shareholders' liquid-
ity.21 This allows the shareholders to realize the gain on their
investment. Going public also enhances the company's publicity and
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part V.
17. SEC, Initial Public Offering (IPO), http://sec.gov/answers/ipo.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2007).
18. IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
19. Id.
20. See HAZEN, supra note 1, at § 1.6.
21. Id.
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increases the company's prestige in the eyes of its customers and
suppliers.22
In the following Sections, I will discuss two methods a company
may choose in order to sell its shares to the public. The first method is
the book-building method, which has been used by the vast majority
of companies that have gone public in the United States.23 The auc-
tion method, on the other hand, has enjoyed less popularity among
U.S. companies going public.24
A. The Book-Building Method
Book-building is the prevailing method in the United States for set-
ting the IPO price. 25 Under this method, as part of the marketing pro-
cess of the offering, potential investors, usually institutional investors,
inform the lead underwriters of the offering how many shares and at
what price they tentatively plan on purchasing in the IPO.26 The IPO
price is set by the underwriters, at their sole discretion, before the
actual offering takes place.27
B. The Auction Method
For at least two decades, auction bidding has been proposed as an
alternative IPO method to replace book-building. 28 Due to progress in
technology and the internet revolution, a few companies have decided
to conduct online public auctions instead of using the customary
book-building method for their IPOs.29
The auction method, however, lacks the support of the major in-
vestment bankers that usually serve as underwriters. 30 Most issuers
had preferred to use the services of renowned underwriters because
they can rely on their marketing services and can expect favorable
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1 n.1 (noting "the 'bookbuilding' IPO ... is the
predominant method for conducting IPOs in the United States and worldwide").
24. Id.
25. Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 3, at 2337.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Katina J. Dorton, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 1381,
1384-88 (1985).
29. Most notably, the financing firm WR Hambrecht + Co has been specializing in using the
auction process through the internet for what it calls "OpenlPOs®." See WR Hambrecht + Co,
http://www.wrhambrecht.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2007). See also Unger, supra note 8, at 1207-
08.
30. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 765-67.
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reviews from the analysts who worked for them. 31 However, some
companies, such as Google Inc., do not need underwriters' marketing
services in order to raise interest in their operations or to induce of-
fers for their shares.32 Thus, Google is an exceptional example of a
company that used an auction process to sell its shares to the public. 33
Under the auction IPO method, the underwriters administer auc-
tion biddings for the company's shares. 34 Because the auction is open
to the public, the auction participants are not restricted to a select
group of chosen investors who are favored by the underwriters. Each
participant's offer is comprised of the number of shares that the inves-
tor wishes to purchase in the IPO and the maximum price such inves-
tor is willing to pay for them.35 The underwriter aggregates all of the
received bids and sets the offer price in a nondiscriminatory Dutch
auction at the highest level that permits the sale of the entire number
of shares offered by the company.36 Thus, the IPO price is set at the
level of the lowest successful bidder.
III. UNDERPRICING
Part II addressed the importance of going public and discussed two
methods that a company can use to sell its shares in a public offering.
As we have seen, these two methods significantly differ in the way
that the price is set for the stock sold in the IPO. This Part will con-
sider the underpricing phenomenon-the practice of setting the IPO
price below the value of the stock. The first Section reviews underpric-
ing when the book-building method is used. The second Section
presents the conventional wisdom concerning auction IPOs and un-
derpricing. Part IV challenges this conventional wisdom.
31. See IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 ("With their compensation and promotion tied to the
success of their firms' investment banking business, some research analysts apparently agreed to
issue and maintain 'buy' recommendations on certain stocks despite aftermarket prices that
jumped to multiples of their IPO prices.").
32. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 764.
33. See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/dsl.htm [hereinafter Google
Registration Statement] ("The auction process being used for our initial public offering differs
from methods that have been traditionally used in most other underwritten initial public offer-
ings in the U.S. In particular, the initial public offering price and the allocation of shares will be
determined primarily by an auction conducted by our underwriters on our behalf.").
34. See id.
35. IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
36. Id.
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A. Book-Building and the Resulting Underpricing
A significant increase in the stock price is common the first days
following a book-building IPO.37 The IPO price is usually much lower
than the price of the shares that is set by the market immediately fol-
lowing the IPO.38 The underpricing of the IPO directly lowers the pro-
ceeds that the issuer receives from the offering and constitutes a loss
for the company. In the IPO, the issuer receives a price for the shares
that is lower than the price in the market the following day.39
The underpricing, however, creates "a pool of instant profits for un-
derwriters to distribute. '40 This is because the underwriters decide
which investors will receive the shares at the low IPO price. It is
widely believed that the underwriters not only use the opportunity to
benefit from the underpricing by extracting benefits from those inves-
tors who receive underpriced shares, but also actually deliberately cre-
ate the opportunity by intentionally pricing offerings well below the
market price.41
B. Auction IPO and Underpricing: Conventional Wisdom
The proponents of the auction IPO method support it mainly be-
cause of the conventional-wisdom belief that a nondiscriminatory
Dutch auction will eliminate the underpricing of the IPO shares. 42
One auction expert said, "You should be relatively indifferent about
37. See, e.g., Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN.
ECON. 235, 235 (1975).
38. Id.
39. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 7, at 182.
40. IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
41. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 7, at 180-82; IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
42. See, e.g., Dorton, supra note 28, at 1384-85; Unger, supra note 8, at 1207-08; IPO REPORT,
supra note 2, at 9 ("IPOs conducted through a true auction model should not experience the
enormous aftermarket price spikes that fueled the abuses of the bubble period. The final IPO
price in an auction represents, or is at least close to, the maximum price that the market is willing
to pay for the issuer's security."); Hurt, supra note 14, at 777-78 ("If IPO shares were distributed
through a more transparent process, with all of the shares in the IPO being allocated anony-
mously at an auction price, then the unfair practices would disappear. The issuer would receive
the maximum amount the market will bear for its equity shares."); Choi & Pritchard, supra note
7, at 182 n.13. Google's Registration statement notes:
It is also crucial that we achieve a good outcome for Google and its current sharehold-
ers. This has led us to pursue an auction-based IPO for our entire offering. Our goal is
to have a share price that reflects a fair market valuation of Google,] ... to achieve a
relatively stable price in the days following the IPO[,j and [to ensure] buyers and sellers
receive a fair price at the IPO.
Google Registration Statement, supra note 33, at iv-v.
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winning or losing the I.P.O. auction, because ... you will have the
option to buy at essentially the same price the next day."'43
According to conventional wisdom, each bidder in an auction IPO
will set her bidding price at the level at which she values the shares,
and the number of shares she offers to buy will reflect the number she
can afford to purchase given liquidity constraints and diversification
opportunities.44 In an auction IPO, the company expects to discover
the market's demand-curve for the stock in order to set the IPO price
at the equilibrium, that is, the highest price that permits the sale of the
entire number offered.45 The outcome of choosing the equilibrium
price as the IPO price is all bidders in the market who value the com-
pany's stock for more than the IPO price will buy in the IPO. Other
bidders would not succeed in the IPO because they value the stock for
less than the IPO price and, therefore, gave a lower bid for the stock.
Thus, at the end of the day, people who own the company's stock
value it at least as high as the IPO price. People who do not own the
stock, the potential buyers of the stock, value the stock at a price
lower than the IPO price.
Absent new information in the market and unforeseen liquidity
needs of the shareholders, shares will not trade hands immediately
following the IPO. As opposed to the customary underwriters' book-
building system, the IPO price will remain the stock price in the mar-
ket. The company will, under these assumptions, maximize its pro-
ceeds from the IPO because it will sell its shares for the market price
and not below.46
To illustrate this, let us look at a simple numerical example. Sup-
pose there are three players in the market: A, B, and C. A values the
company's stock at one hundred dollars per share and wishes to buy
43. Saul Hansell, For Google, Going Dutch Has Its Rewards and Its Risks, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2004, at C1 (quoting Lawrence M. Ausubel, an auction expert and economics professor at the
University of Maryland).
44. It may be that a person who values the stock at a certain price and calculates how many
shares she can afford to buy based on her liquidity constraints may wish to buy more shares in
the event that the purchase price of the share will be much lower than her valuation of the share,
as she will then be able to afford purchasing additional shares. In such case, the person is likely
to split her bid and basically place multiple bids for different price ranges and offer to buy, for
example, one hundred shares for up to one hundred dollars each and an extra fifty shares for up
to fifty dollars each.
45. See Google Registration Statement, supra note 33, at 27 ("As part of this auction process,
we are attempting to assess the market demand for our Class A common stock and to set the size
of the offering and the initial public offering price to meet that demand. Buyers hoping to cap-
ture profits shortly after our Class A common stock begins trading may be disappointed.").
46. See Unger, supra note 8, at 1207 ("In theory, by more accurately gauging market demand,
the auction process should result in the maximum amount of offering proceeds for the company
... .11).
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ten shares. B values the stock at seventy-five dollars per share and, for
that price, she wishes to buy ten shares as well. C, on the other hand,
values the shares at only fifty dollars and is interested in buying ten
shares for no more than fifty dollars a share. Let us assume the com-
pany plans to sell twenty shares in the public offering. If it sets the
IPO price at seventy-five dollars, both A and B successfully bid for ten
shares each. C's bid does not succeed. However, since both A and B
value the shares for more than C does, no shares will transfer hands
immediately following the IPO. Investors who value the shares for as
much as or more than the share price will already own the maximum
number of shares they desire to own and, therefore, will not be willing
to sell for less than what they perceive as the shares' value.
The evidence, however, tells a more complex story. One can learn
from the few auction offerings that took place in the United States the
last few years that the auction method does not ensure that significant
fluctuations in the stock price will not occur following the IPO.47 In
fact, some of the companies who used the auction method for their
public offering experienced share price increases of more than one
hundred percent in the days immediately following the offering. 48
The following Part provides a model that explains this counterintui-
tive result and shows why and when auction IPOs can result in signifi-
cant underpricing of the IPO stock price.
IV. INVESTORS' MANIPULATIVE STRATEGY: UNDERPRICING
IN AUCTION IPOs
Part III addressed why auction IPOs are commonly expected to
eliminate underpricing in public offerings. This Part presents a strat-
egy that can be used by investors in an auction IPO to decrease the
auction price. The first Section illustrates the method and describes
the potential underpricing in auction IPOs. The second Section devel-
ops a linear model that generally analyzes the underbidding strategy
and its results.
A. The Underbidding Strategy
A rational bidder wishes to maximize the value of her assets. Buy-
ing stock below the value she assigns to the purchased stock is a prof-
itable strategy which increases her wealth. If the bidder can
47. See Hansell, supra note 43; Unger, supra note 8, at 1207-08.
48. See Unger, supra note 8, at 1207-08.
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manipulate the IPO price and lower it, she can increase the value of
her assets. 49
The bidder does not have to bid for as many shares as she can af-
ford at the price that she values the shares. Instead, the bidder can bid
for a different number, a different price, or both. Each of the possible
changes in the way the bidder bids can have a different outcome, as
we shall now see.
Changing the price for which the bidder offers to buy the shares,
either lowering or raising it, not only increases the bidder's risk, but
also likely decreases the bidder's profits.50 If the bidder raises the
price of her offer, she exposes herself to the risk that she might have
to pay more for the shares than the price at which she values them. In
addition, if the IPO price is set at or below the price the bidder be-
lieves the true value of the shares to be, raising the offering price
would not change the outcome of the auction. This is because, in a
nondiscriminatory Dutch auction, the price is set at the level of the
lowest successful bidder.5' Thus, increasing the offering price above
the true value of the share is not an optimal strategy.
If the bidder, on the other hand, lowers the price she offers for the
shares, she exposes herself to the risk that her bid might be too low.
Although the IPO price will be set below her true value of the shares,
she might not succeed in participating in the bid because her bid will
be below the IPO price. On the other hand, the new, lowered price
the bidder chooses could still be too high to change the IPO price if it
still is above the IPO price.
Only in the case where the bidder can predict the IPO price pre-
cisely will she be able to lower the IPO price by setting her bid at a
price just below the IPO price that would have prevailed without ma-
nipulation. Otherwise, other bidders may take her place in the offer
and leave her in the losing group of bidders. Reducing the bidding
price is a very risky strategy and is likely to be unprofitable.
Similarly, increasing the number of shares the bidder offers to
purchase in the IPO is unlikely to have favorable results; it is likely to
decrease the bidder's profits from the bidding. A bidder who offers to
buy more shares might be forced to buy the excess shares. 52
49. This is because the bidder's assets will now include stocks that are worth more than the
lower IPO price which the bidder paid for them.
50. See Dorton, supra note 28, at 1391.
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. It is noteworthy that Google, in its registration statement, stated that it reserves the right
to choose not to allocate the issued shares pro rata among the successful bidders, but rather it
may choose to use a maximum share allocation method on a tiered basis. Such a method sets the
maximum amount that a bidder may receive and grants some bidders their entire bid and others
2007]
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However, under certain scenarios, mathematically shown in Section
B, a rational bidder will profit from lowering the number of shares she
offers to buy in the IPO. By lowering that number, the auction price
will be driven downward. A lower IPO price directly increases the
value for the bidder. At the same time, a decrease in the number of
shares bought at the IPO decreases the value for the bidder. The
lower price and the decrease of the purchase number are opposing
forces. Under certain circumstances, this strategy of lowering the
number of shares a bidder offers is a preferred strategy that increases
the aggregate value of the bidder's assets.53
As a result of bidders strategically lowering the number they offer
to purchase in the auction IPO, the company will not see the real de-
mand curve for its shares. Rather, the company will see a curve that is
shifted towards the axes; for a given price the number of shares bid-
ders are willing to buy is lower. The IPO price will be set at a lower
price than equilibrium, that is, the highest price purchasers are willing
to pay for the stock sold. This will allow trade of the shares in the
stock market the day after the IPO. Following the IPO, bidders who
value the stock for more than the IPO price but did not purchase the
optimal number of shares they wished to own because they used the
manipulative underbidding strategy will buy shares in the aftermarket.
This trading in the stock market will cause the share price to rise.
To illustrate how the strategy works, let us first look at a simple
numeric example with four bidders. The value that each bidder assigns
to the company's shares and the corresponding number of shares they
are willing to purchase are listed in the table below.
Bidder PriceNalue per Share (P) Quantity (Q)
A $100 10
B $ 75 10
C $ 50 10
D $ 25 10
TABLE No. 1. A NUMERIC EXAMPLE WITH FOUR BIDDERS
a lesser amount, but no less than eighty percent of the bid. In order to avoid manipulative over-
bidding, the company specifically reserved the right to reject "inappropriately large bids" all
together. See Google Registration Statement, supra note 33, at 27.
53. To be sure, if the investor wishes to obtain a large enough block of shares in order to gain
a control-block, lowering the amount is counterproductive. However, the IPO process usually
does not permit the purchase of a control-block. Google, for example, specifically stated in its
registration statement that it retained the right not to include in the auction any bids that seem
manipulatively too large. See id.
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Let us assume that the company wishes to sell twenty shares. Bidder
A and Bidder B offer the highest prices for the shares, one hundred
dollars and seventy-five dollars respectively, and together are willing
to buy the entire number of shares offered by the company. Thus,
without strategic manipulation, the IPO auction price would be Pjpo =
$75, the lowest price of the successful bids. We can calculate Bidder
A's profit under these assumptions by subtracting the value she as-
signs to the shares bought and the purchase price: (100 - 75) x 10 =
$250.
Now let us assume that Bidder A employs the manipulative strategy
and lowers the numbers she asks for in the auction. Suppose Bidder A
now bids P = $100 and Q = 9. Given the manipulative bid, the new
IPO price would be P, = $50, the highest price that enables the com-
pany to sell all of the twenty offered shares. Bidder A's new strategic
profit is (100 - 50) x 9 = $450, an increase of $200 in comparison to the
profit without the manipulation. 54
Even if the company allocates the shares to all bidders who have
offered to buy at or above P pro rata, rather than allowing the lower
successful bidder (Bidder C) to buy only the number of shares left
after the higher bidders (Bidders A and B) receive the entire number
of shares they bid on, we can see that our Bidder A still profits. In this
example, a pro rata allocation of the shares to the bidders means that
each bidder will receive approximately two-thirds of her bid, which is
the ratio of the issued shares (twenty) and the total successful bids
(thirty).55 Bidder A's profits, under this assumption, would be (100 -
50) x 9 x 2/3 = $300, which reflects a profit of fifty dollars deriving from
the strategy. Furthermore, one can see that if Bidder B employs the
strategy instead of Bidder A, her profits will be even higher.56
It should be noted that the calculation above does not take into
account the bidders' profits from purchasing shares in the aftermarket
immediately following the IPO to compensate for decreased number
of shares they bid on in the IPO. Such trade in the aftermarket will
54. We can, of course, easily see that if the company wishes to sell, for example, eleven shares
rather than twenty, the strategy will not work. To ensure profit from this strategy the investor
has to be sophisticated enough to have an understanding of the distribution of the demand in the
market. In Section B of this Part, I analyze the requirements for the strategy to work in a linear
model.
55. Actually, the number of total successful bids would be twenty-nine. This number was
rounded up to thirty to simplify the mathematical equation.
56. This is because, under these assumptions, both Bidder A and Bidder B experience the
same benefit from the decreased IPO price, while Bidder A, who values the share more than
Bidder B, stands to lose more for not purchasing another share for less than what she values it.
This analysis is assuming that the manipulative bidder is restricted from participating in the
aftermarket due to transaction costs or otherwise, as discussed below.
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expose the underpricing of the shares in the IPO because the trade
among the three successful bidders will cause the price to increase. In
the example above, Bidder C, who buys one share in the auction for
fifty dollars and does not value it for more, would be willing to sell her
share to Bidder B, who manipulatively lowered her bid and offered to
buy nine shares, although she wanted ten. Thus, if the share does
switch hands, it will be sold for a price that is not less than fifty dollars
but could be as high as seventy-five dollars, which is how much Bidder
B really values it.
However, the underpricing, which means that the company sold its
shares for less than their true value in the market, exists even if it does
not openly manifest itself in the trading immediately following the
IPO. Transaction costs, for example, might postpone the additional
aftermarket sale. The price of the stock in the market may not neces-
sarily increase dramatically in the first three days immediately follow-
ing the IPO. The investors who chose to buy a fewer number of shares
in the IPO may decide to buy the additional shares gradually in the
months that follow the IPO in order to prevent an excessive price
pressure. Therefore, the increase in the price of the share may be post-
poned in comparison to the regular book-building method that is usu-
ally followed by an immediate price increase.5 7 After the lapse of
several months, the market price of a company that used the auction
method should stabilize at the level that represents the true demand
for the shares. In an efficient market, shares will be owned eventually
by the shareholder who values them the most.
B. The General Model
In order to generalize the underbidding strategy and examine the
requirements for the strategy to succeed, let us look at Bidder H. Bid-
der H values the stock at Ph and can afford Qh shares at this price. Ppo
is the equilibrium price, the highest price the company will be able to
sell all of the offered shares, without strategic manipulations. H will
profit Qh X (Ph - PIPO) from participating in the IPO without
manipulation.
If H can lower the IPO price by Pd to P (PI = Plpo - Pd) by lowering
her offered number by Qd, then her new profit will be the product of
the adjusted number multiplied by the difference between the value
she assigns to the company's shares and the new lower IPO price: (Qh
- Qd) X Ph - (Qh - Qd) x P which equals Qh X (Ph - PIPO) + Qh x Pd-
Qd x (Ph - P1, o + Pd).
57. See supra Part III.A.
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Assuming the investor can buy shares in the market on the days
that follow the IPO for no more than the equilibrium price Pipo,
which should be the prevailing price after the market stabilizes, the
strategy always assures a profit. This is because the bidder buys the
same number of shares, only now she does this in two stages, first in
the auction and later in the aftermarket. However, she pays a lower
price for some of the shares, and she pays the same price she would
have paid without the strategy for the rest of the shares.
Restricting bidders from participating in the aftermarket would
lower the profitability of the strategy and deter some investors from
choosing to lower their bids. This, in turn, would reduce the under-
pricing of the stock. For this reason, either a regulation prohibiting
such trade in the aftermarket or a similar contractual restriction may
well improve the efficiency of auction IPOs and increase the proceeds
received by the issuer.
The model below will examine the effect of the strategy assuming
that the investor does not buy more shares in the aftermarket immedi-
ately following the IPO, but only participates in the IPO. This is done
not only to be conservative, but also to check the ability of the pro-
posed restriction on aftermarket trades to eradicate underpricing. Fur-
thermore, there is no guarantee that the investor will be able to buy
more shares in the aftermarket for the desired price because of price
pressure and other market inefficiencies.
Thus, the difference in profit between the two strategies-bidding
for the number of shares the investor wants to own and manipula-
tively bidding for a lower number without the benefit of aftermarket
trading-is:
(1) A = Qh X Pd - Qd x (Ph - PPo + Pd)
Pd, the amount by which the price is lowered as a result of the stra-
tegic behavior of the investor, is a function of Qd, the number by
which the investor strategically lowers her bid. Pd is the change in the
IPO price that results from lowering the demand number by Qd.
Therefore, let us maximize the difference (1) by taking the derivative
with respect to Qd and setting it at zero:
dA dPd dPd
(2) 0 = - = Qh x -- +Pfpo-Ph-Pd-Qdx _ _
dQd dQd dQd
dPd
Let us set A = dQd, the elasticity of the demand, that is, the mar-
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ginal change in Pd caused by a marginal change in Qd. It is, of course, a
function of Qd, but, for simplicity, we should assume that the demand
curve is linear, so A is a constant and:
(3) Pd = A X Qd
We expand the derivative (2):
(4) 0 = QhxA +PlPo-Ph-A X Qd- QdxA = Qh xA + PlPo-
Ph - 2A x Qd
We solve for Qd, thus obtaining the number by which the bidder has
to lower his bid in order to maximize his profit from participating in
the auction:
(QhxA+Ppo-Ph) 
_ Qh (Ph-PIPO)
2A 2 2A
From this equation (5), we can see that in order for a bidder to
exploit the strategy and bid for Q, shares in the auction, she should be
able to estimate both Plpo, the real equilibrium price that would result
if there were no manipulative strategic bidding, and A, the elasticity.
Fairly sophisticated investors, such as investment bankers, are well
positioned to calculate these variables.58 Unfortunately, most of the
public investors are not able to do this, but members of the public who
participate in the auction IPO will benefit from the manipulative be-
havior of the sophisticated investor. Because the method assigns a sin-
gle price for all participants, the lowered auction price will be the
purchase price of all those who successfully bid in the auction.
In addition, we can see from the equation for Qd above that since
Ph > PPo, the bidder must not lower her bid by more than half of her
original number to maximize the profits from the strategy: Qd < 'bQh.
Further, we can learn from the equation that the strategy works
Ph - PIpo
only when Qh > A otherwise the optimal Qd, comes out
negative. Therefore, we can see from this inequality that there are
three requirements that help fulfill the equation and make the strat-
egy profitable.
58. Some variations on the Dutch IPO auction make it even easier for the investors to calcu-
late these variables. An example for such variation is the 2000 version of how Wit Capital Corpo-
ration planned on conducting internet auctions that it underwrote. See Hurt, supra note 14, at
766-67 ("During this auction, any internet user could view the aggregate demand in the auction
at each price point, making the pricing of the shares virtually transparent.").
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First, the left-hand side of the inequality, Qh, the number the inves-
tor wants to buy, must be sufficiently high. This means that large in-
vestors are more suited to exploit the strategy.
Second, the denominator of the right-hand side of the inequality, A,
the elasticity, must be sufficiently high. This means that the distribu-
tion of bids of the auction participants must be spread in such a man-
ner that renders the quantity sensitive enough to the price. The more
elastic the demand curve, the easier it is to exploit the strategy and
succeed in lowering the auction price.
Third, Ph, the price that the investor believes the stock is worth,
must be sufficiently close to Plpo, the real equilibrium price that
would result if there were no manipulative strategic bidding. In other
words, the investor must not value the company much more than the
market does. Thus, if the investor has positive asymmetric information
about the company, indicating that the company will be undervalued
by the market because the market does not know about the good in-
formation, the investor will be better off not lowering her bid, and
refraining from using the strategy.
Now let us see what the maximum profit for the bidder from em-
ploying the strategy is. We first recall Pd from (3) and substitute Qd
from (5), to find that:
QhxA+PIPo-Ph QhxA+PIpo-Ph(6) P = A x 2A=2A 2
We recall from (1) that the profit from the strategy is:
Qh X Pd - Qd x (Ph - PPO + Pd).
Expanding (1) and substituting Pd from equation (6), we find that
the profit is:
(7) (A x Qh - (Ph -PPo))
2
4A
Using (5), we can recast this profit as:
Pd2
(8) A =- = Q X Pd
A
Equation (8) shows that the profit from the strategy is never nega-
tive under the assumptions, because both Pd and Qd are positive. That
means, subject to the assumptions above, the strategy is profitable.
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V. REGULATORY ASPECTS
Part IV showed how investors in auction IPOs can bid strategically
and manipulate the stock price downward. Such strategic behavior
may cause underpricing of the IPO and reduce the proceeds for the
company. In the days following the auction IPO, subsequent trade in
the company's stock will raise the price of the stock in the market.
The manipulative strategic behavior, however, cannot be identified
merely from judging the bid an investor makes in the auction. This is
because the underbidding strategy manifests itself only as an offer for
fewer shares, and Qh, the real number the bidder would ask to buy in
the auction without the strategy, cannot be proven.
However, if the investor makes additional purchases immediately
following the IPO for more shares, it may well be an indication that
she intentionally lowered her bid in order to reduce the IPO price
because she could have bid for it during the auction. As I have shown
in Part IV, lowering the bid and purchasing the reduced number in the
aftermarket is a profitable strategy for investors that reduces the issu-
ers' proceeds from the IPO. 59
Thus, in order to deter the behavior that causes the company to sell
its stock in the auction IPO for less than its true market value, ex ante
prevention measures should be considered. Both a regulatory and
contractual undertakings can be used to prohibit successful IPO bid-
ders from purchasing shares in the market immediately following the
IPO. This proposed restriction on after auction trades will lower the
profitability of the underbidding strategy. To be sure, if the company
allocated to those investors less shares than they offered to purchase
in the auction, then the restriction should only apply to the number of
shares exceeding the difference between the number investors offered
to buy and the number they received in the IPO.
Assuming such restrictions are in place and the successful bidder is
barred from buying shares in the market immediately following the
auction, in order for the bidders' strategy to work, it must still produce
profits without relying on trading in the days that follow the IPO.
59. Indeed, the recent Google auction IPO was significantly undervalued. The market price of
the Google stock rose considerably in the days following the auction IPO. Interestingly, less than
a month following the IPO, Fidelity Investments owned about twenty-five percent of the shares
auctioned in the IPO. Fidelity, as a sophisticated investor, may well have known that, in a Dutch
auction, a bid for a quarter of the total auctioned shares had a potentially significant impact on
the IPO price. Why would Fidelity buy such a large amount of shares in the IPO when it could
have divided the sale and, thus, lowered the initial price? Because the securities' regulations do
not require disclosure of the exact purchase dates, we cannot check Fidelity's behavior, but it is
plausible that Fidelity bought some of the stock in the IPO and some of it in the following days,
choosing to strategically underbid in the auction, as explained in Part IV.
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Though to a lesser extent, this does happen in some circumstances, as
I have shown in Part IV. Even without the possibility of purchasing
more shares in the market following the auction IPO, certain investors
can profit from manipulatively underbidding their offer in the auction.
However, without the bidder trading on the days following the IPO,
the restricted strategy cannot be detected because an offer to
purchase fewer shares and Qh, the number of shares they can afford to
purchase, are far from easily proven. Therefore, the strategy cannot
be entirely prevented even if prohibited by a regulation, but it can and
should be limited.
The auction IPO method cannot ensure receipt of the maximum
amount of offering proceeds to the company, though conventional
wisdom erroneously believes it can.60 As shown above, the auction
method cannot ensure the auction price will reflect the real and un-
manipulated demand for the shares. Therefore, the auction method
should not necessarily be a preferable substitute to the book-building
method. The NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee recommenda-
tion to allow the market to choose the preferable method, while facili-
tating the practice of alternative methods and restricting abusive
allocation practices, 61 seems justified and rightly cautious. On the
other hand, a regulatory eradication of the book-building method, as
some commentators might prefer,62 seems premature.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have shown that under certain circumstances in an auction IPO,
some sophisticated investors can maximize their wealth by choosing to
bid in a strategic way that causes underpricing. This outcome is con-
trary to conventional wisdom that postulates auction IPOs always pre-
vent underpricing. Large, sophisticated investors, however, are likely
to be better off by offering to buy fewer shares in the IPO than actual
number they ultimately wish to have. This action is likely to manipu-
late the IPO price and increase investors' total wealth. Furthermore,
because this manipulative strategic behavior is practically unidentifi-
able, no regulatory measure could successfully prevent it. However, in
60. See supra Part III.B.
61. IPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
62. See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 14, at 788-89; Bill Hambrecht, Comments on the FINRAINYSE
IPO Advisory Committee Report, BILL'S PoINr OF VIEW (May 29, 2003), http://www.wrham-
brecht.com/ind/strategy/bill-pov/200305/index.html; Bill Hambrecht, Fixing the IPO Process,
BILL'S POINT OF VIEW (Sept. 2002), http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/strategy/billpov/200209/
index.html.
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order to limit the extent of this behavior and maximize issuers' pro-
ceeds from auction IPOs, I propose to restrict bidders' ability to par-
ticipate in the aftermarket.
